The Louisiana Legislature and Louisiana Supreme Court made some changes to appellate practice in 2025. From eliminating agency deference to clarifying the boundaries of manifest error review, appellate practitioners need to adjust. Here's what you should know.

Agency Deference Is Dead

For decades, challenging an agency's interpretation of its own statutes was an uphill climb. Courts routinely deferred to agencies' readings unless the interpretation was arbitrary or capricious.

That framework collapsed on June 8, 2025, when Governor Landry signed HB 99 into law. The new statute adds La. R.S. 49:978.1(H), which explicitly commands that courts "shall not defer to the agency's interpretation of the statute or rule." Instead, courts must interpret statutes and rules de novo.

This is a seismic shift for administrative appeals. If the Department of Revenue or any other agency interprets a statute unfavorably, the appellate court must now read the law with fresh eyes. No more uphill battles against a presumption that the agency got it right. Louisiana joins a growing number of states following the U.S. Supreme Court's lead in Loper Bright, eliminating Chevron-style deference.

Practice tip: Administrative appeals filed after June 8, 2025, should lead with pure statutory interpretation arguments, treating the question as one of first impression.

Campbell v. Windsor Court: Duty and Scope of Duty Are Different Questions

In March, the Supreme Court clarified an issue that had long muddied premises liability analysis: the distinction between duty and scope of duty.

William Campbell, a frequent guest at the Windsor Court Hotel, was robbed and injured in the hotel's courtyard on Christmas Day 2008. He had approached an unfamiliar vehicle and, during conversation with its occupants, twice displayed a substantial amount of cash. One occupant grabbed the money, and the vehicle sped away, dragging Campbell with it.

The Fourth Circuit reversed a summary judgment for the hotel, finding genuine issues of material fact on foreseeability. The Supreme Court disagreed and reinstated summary judgment for the defense. Campbell v. Orient-Express Hotels La., Inc., 2024-C-00840 (La. 03/21/25), 403 So.3d 573.

Justice Crain's concurrence is particularly useful for practitioners: he confirmed that "scope of duty can be resolved on summary judgment if reasonable persons could not disagree that the manner of the injury is either within or beyond the scope of the duty."

Practice tip: When defending premises liability cases, frame your summary judgment motion around scope of duty as a separate legal question. And when opposing, be prepared to show not just that a duty exists, but that the specific harm falls within that duty's protective scope.

Pellecer v. Werner: A Name on the Product Isn't Enough

In October, the Supreme Court significantly narrowed "apparent manufacturer" liability under the Louisiana Products Liability Act. Pellecer v. Werner Co., 2024-01492 (La. 04/01/25), 403 So.3d 597.

Carlos Pellecer died after falling from a Werner-brand aluminum extension ladder. His family sued Werner Co. (Delaware) and New Werner Holding Co., Inc. Neither company actually manufactured the ladder. The original manufacturer, Werner Co. (Pennsylvania), had gone bankrupt and changed its name. The new Werner entities had acquired the trademark in bankruptcy specifically because of the brand's recognition and value.

The jury found for the plaintiffs and awarded over $5 million, assigning 50% fault to the new Werner entities. The Fourth Circuit affirmed, deferring to the jury's finding that the Werner name created a reasonable perception that the defendants manufactured the product.

The Supreme Court reversed. Under La. R.S. 9:2800.53(1)(a), a company qualifies as a "manufacturer" if it "labels a product as his own or who otherwise holds himself out to be a manufacturer." The Court held that merely having a name on a product — even a name synonymous with the product category — is insufficient. The company must affirmatively do something with the product itself.

This decision is a significant win for successor companies that acquire trademarks through bankruptcy sales. It transforms the apparent manufacturer doctrine from one focused on public perception to one requiring corporate action.

Practice tip: If you're defending a successor company in a products case, develop the record on what the successor actually did (or didn't do) with the product at issue. Mere trademark ownership, without more, should not establish manufacturer status.

Foundation Elevation v. Miller: Abandonment Waiver Clarified

In May, the Supreme Court issued Foundation Elevation & Repair, LLC v. Miller, 2024-00810 (La. 05/09/25), 408 So.3d 893, clarifying when a defendant's post-abandonment conduct waives the right to assert abandonment under La. C.C.P. art. 561.

The facts presented a common defense dilemma. After more than three years of inactivity, the plaintiffs moved to confirm a default judgment against Direct Source Home Renovation, LLC (DSHR), a third-party defendant. DSHR's counsel responded by filing a one-page general denial answer. Then, four days later, it moved to dismiss the claims as abandoned. The trial court granted the dismissal. The Fifth Circuit reversed, reasoning that filing an answer after the abandonment period was "inconsistent with the intent to treat claims as abandoned."

The Supreme Court reversed the Fifth Circuit and reinstated the dismissal. The Court held that post-abandonment conduct must be analyzed through principles of renunciation, not mere acknowledgment. The distinction matters: acknowledgment is a lesser showing that can interrupt prescription before it runs, while renunciation requires a "clear, direct, and absolute" demonstration of intent to proceed with litigation after the prescriptive period has accrued.

The Court traced the confusion to dicta in Clark v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 2000-3010 (La. 5/15/01), 785 So. 2d 779, which had suggested that post-abandonment waiver could occur through "acknowledgment." Multiple courts of appeal had relied on Clark to find waiver based on routine defensive filings. The Miller Court expressly rejected this line of cases, holding that they "are not supported by the law and should not be relied upon."

Under Miller, post-abandonment waiver is limited to conduct that clearly renounces the abandonment defense — such as submitting a case for decision on the merits, or entering a contractual stay agreement. A general denial answer, filed to protect against default and followed immediately by an abandonment motion, does not qualify.

Practice tip: If you're defending a case that may be abandoned, you can file a protective answer without waiving abandonment, but move to dismiss promptly. Document your intent to assert abandonment, and avoid any action that could be construed as seeking a merits resolution.

Appellate Courts Go Digital

The statewide push toward mandatory electronic filing reaches the appellate courts in 2026. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal has announced that, effective January 1, 2026, attorneys may no longer file by U.S. mail or commercial shipping services like FedEx and UPS. Filings must be submitted electronically or delivered in person.

The Fifth Circuit also announced it will stop transmitting rulings and correspondence to attorneys by mail. Unless mail delivery is specifically required by law, all court rulings will be delivered electronically under La. C.C.P. art. 1313.

These changes flow from Act 694 of 2024 (HB 380) and Act 352 of 2025 (HB 310), which mandate electronic filing systems statewide by January 1, 2026. While trial court filings can still be made in person on paper, appellate practitioners relying on overnight delivery to meet deadlines will need to adjust.

Practice tip: If you haven't fully transitioned to appellate e-filing, the deadline is imminent. Register with each circuit's e-filing system now — not when you have a brief due.

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Andy Lee is a partner at Jones Walker LLP, Board Certified in Appellate Practice by the Louisiana Board of Legal Specialization, and co-leader of the Technology Industry Section and its Privacy, Data Strategy, and Artificial Intelligence team.